NOTES
PUTTING LIFE INSURANCE BEYOND THE CLAIMS OF
TRUSTEES IN BANKRUPTCY
In addition to fulfilling its primary purpose of protecting the designated
beneficiary upon the death of the insured, life insurance has become one of the
best recognized forms of investment and self-compelled saving., Because of the
latter characteristics, the cash surrender value of a policy on the life of the bankrupt insured frequently is a valuable asset of the estate. Debtors, as might be
expected, have sought to avoid relinquishing to their creditors any part of their
policies. It will be the object of this note to analyze both the extent to which
this may be legitimately done and the attempts of unscrupulous debtors to use
their life insurance policies as a means of avoiding the claims of creditors in
bankruptcy.
I
The trustee gets rights only to that life insurance which comes within
§ 70(a)(3) or the proviso to § 70(a)(5).2 The early cases 3 held that life insurance, like any other species of property, came within the terms of the body of
I Holmes, J. in Grigsby v. Russell, 222 U.S. 149 (I9I1).
2

xx U.S.C.A. §

1o

(1927).

The provisions of the Bankruptcy Act applicable to determin-

ing the trustee's rights to life insurance policies are: "§ 70. Title to Property-(a) The trustee
....
shall ....
be vested by operation of law with the title of the bankrupt, as of the date
he was adjudged a bankrupt except in so far as it is to property which is exempt, to all ....
(3) powers which he might have exercised for his own benefit, but not those which he might
have exercised for some other person ....
(5) property which prior to the filing of the petition
he could by any means have transferred or which might have been levied upon and sold under
judicial process against him: Provided,that when any bankrupt shall have any insurance policy
which has a cash surrender value payable to himself, his estate, or personal representatives, he
may, within thirty days after the cash surrender value has been ascertained and stated to the
trustee by the company issuing the same, pay or secure to the trustee the sum so ascertained
and stated, and continue to hold, own, and carry such policy free from the claims of the creditors participating in the distribution of his estate under the bankruptcy proceedings, otherwise the policy shall pass to the trustee as assets .......
Where the dealings of the bankrupt with his life insurance are under state law fraudulent as
to his creditors, those dealings may be set aside by the trustee just as he might avoid fraudulent
conveyance of other property under § 70(a) (4) or under § 70(e), which empowers the trustee to
"avoid any transfer by the bankrupt which any creditor of such bankrupt might have avoided." ii U.S.C.A. § iio(e) (1927). Kirkpatrick v. Johnson, 197 Fed. 235 (D.C. Pa. 1912). The
same result was reached under the Bankruptcy Act of 1867. Barnes v. Vetterlein, 16 Fed.
218 (D.C. N.Y. 1882).
3In re Slingful, io6 Fed. 154 (D.C. Md. igoo); In re Welling, 113 Fed. 189 (C.C.A. 7 th
1902).
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§ 70(a) (5) so that any insurance on the life of the bankrupt which, prior to the
filing of the petition, the bankrupt could have transferred by any means would
pass to the trustee; and the proviso was merely a qualification which permitted
the bankrupt to redeem certain types of policies described therein. But the
United States Supreme Court, in an endeavor to protect the beneficiaries, reversed these decisions and held that the sole source of the trustee's title to life
insurance policies is the proviso and that the rest of § 70(a)(5) does not affect
the trustee's rights.4 As the proviso has been construed, the trustee is never entitled to more than the cash surrender value of the policy.5 Where there is no
cash surrender value at the time the petition in bankruptcy is filed, the trustee
gets nothing-not even a part of the proceeds upon the subsequent death of the
insured. 6 § 70(a) has been further construed not to give the trustee the title to
the policy subject to the bankrupt's right of redemption but to invest him with
a power to demand the cash surrender value. Unless the trustee exercises this
power before the policy matures, the beneficiary's interest becomes indefeasible
and the trustee acquires no interest whatsoever in the policy.7 Although the
trustee pays premiums on the policy and the bankrupt fails to redeem 8 it within
the time specified by the proviso, upon the death of the insured, the beneficiaries
4 A proviso sometimes embodies additional legislation although its usual function is to
limit generalities and exclude from the scope of the statute that which would otherwise be
within its terms. Burlingham v. Crouse, 228 U.S. 459 (1913).
s Remington, Bankruptcy § 1243 (1923).

6 Burlingham v. Crouse, 228 U.S. 459 (193).
7 Eldredge v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 2,7 Mass. 444, xo5 N.E. 361 (1914) (suit against both
the insurance company and beneficiary before the insurer had paid the beneficiary). Frederick
v. Fidelity Mut. Life Ins. Co., 256 U.S. 395 (1921) has been regarded as standing for the same
proposition. See 35 Harv. L. Rev. 80, 82 (1921); Vance, Insurance (2d ed. 1930). This assumption finds no support in the express language of the Frederick case which was only determining
the rights of the insurance company after the company had paid the beneficiary. See the decision at p. 398.
8
In order to prevent the policy frombeing surrendered by the trustee, -the bankrupt must

pay the trustee the cash surrender value of the policy within thirty days. § 7o(a)(5), supra
note 2. This presents a problem of serious proportions since, by hypothesis, the bankruptcy
proceedings leave the bankrupt without any substantial amount of money. If the insured is
unable to borrow money from his friends, he should be able to arrange to borrow the cash surrender value from the insurer. Because the cash surrender and loan values of the policy are
approximately the same (Vance, Insurance, 285 (2d ed. 1930)) whenever there is a cash surrender value there will be a loan value. It is possible, however, that if the insurance company
knows of the petition in bankruptcy, it will refuse to lend money to the bankrupt, for after it
has received actual notice of the proceedings it cannot safely pay money to the insured. See
Frederick v. Fidelity Insurance Co., 256 U.S. 395 (1921). The bankrupt should therefore arrange to have the insurer pay the money to the trustee directly. He should have no difficulty in
securing the consent of both the trustee and the insurer to some such settlement for it is to the
interest of the insurance company that the policy should not lapse and the interests of the
bankrupt's creditors are not prejudiced if the insured retains the policy and they receive payment in some manner. Furthermore, § 70(a)(5) gives the bankrupt the option of paying or
securingthe cash surrender value to the trustee.
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obtain the entire proceeds less the cash surrender value as of the time the petition was filed.9
The express wording of the proviso to § 70(a) (5)gives the trustee the cash
surrender value only when the beneficiary is the bankrupt or his estate. x A
literal construction of the language would have made it possible to deprive the
trustee of all his rights to the debtor's life insurance. The insured simply by
making a third person the beneficiary and reserving to himself the right to
change the beneficiary could prevent the trustee's acquiring any interest in the
policy while, in reality, retaining full control over the cash value of the policy,
a control which he could exercise to his own advantage after his discharge in
bankruptcy." This type of evasion has been prevented by giving to the trustee
the insured's power to change the beneficiary. The result is reached by virtue of
§ 70(a) (3)which gives the trustee "the powers which the bankrupt might have
exercised for his own benefit. '' "1 Even in the absence of § 70(a) (3)the same conclusion would probably be reached to prevent fraud.'3
Where neither the right to change the beneficiary nor the right to get the cash
surrender value is reserved by the insured, the third party beneficiary acquires
an absolute vested interest in the insurance, 4 and, in the absence of fraud,
neither the cash surrender value during the life of the insured nor any part of the
proceeds upon his death pass to the trustee because the vested interest of the
beneficiary does not constitute an asset of the bankrupt estate, the insurance
not being within the sole control of the insured.' s The making of such a policy
and the payment of premiums by the bankrupt while solvent were valid gifts
9Ehrhart v. New York Life Ins. Co., 45 F. (2d) 804 (D.C. In.
trustee should not be repaid for his expenditure on the premiums.
xoSee § 70(a), supra note 2.

1929).

Query whether the

Cohen v. Samuels, 245 U.S. 5o (1917).
Cohen v. Samuels, ibid.; Malone v. Cohn, 236 Fed. 882 (C.C.A. 5th i916). The trustee,
however, would still be limited to recovering the cash surrender value.
's Cohen v. Samuels, supra note ii, at p. 53. Cf. Dean v. Davis, 242 U.S. 438 (1917).
' "By saying that the beneficiary's right is 'vested' is meant that the beneficiary has a right
to receive such sum as may become payable in accordance with the terms of the policy, coupled

with an immunity from destruction of that right by any modification or cancellation of the
policy by the agreement of the insured and insurer to which the beneficiary does not consent."
Vance, The Beneficiary's Interest in a Life Insurance Policy, 3i Yale L. J. 343, 344 (1922).
In determining whether the third party has an absolute and vested beneficial interest which
cannot be reached by the trustee, two distinct questions must be answered: first, has the insured reserved to himself the right to change the beneficiary? Second, assuming that he has not,
can he reach the cash surrender value without the consent of the beneficiary? If either question
is answered affirmatively, the trustee can get the cash surrender value. "It may be conceded
that in the standard policy both the right to change the beneficiary are options or privileges

reserved to the insured, either one of which, if exercised, would clearly convert the policy into
property in his hands." See In re Pinals, 38 F. (2d) 117, ri9 (D.C. N.J. 1930).
IsIn re Fetterman, 243 Fed. 975 (D.C. Ohio 19,7); In re Grant, 21 F. (2d) 88 (D.C. Wis.
1927);In re Cooper's Estate, 28 F. (2d) 438 (D.C. Md. 1928).
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and not affected by the donor's subsequent bankruptcy.,6 Accordingly, where a
third person is an absolute beneficiary, he may, after the bankruptcy of the
insured, get the cash surrender value from the insurer and give it to the insured
free from the claims of the trustee. 7 And if the insured should pay a creditor
within the four months' period with money borrowed on the policy by the absolute beneficiary, he has not bestowed a voidable preference for there is no diminution of the bankrupt estate.'5
When the insured while insolvent changes the beneficiary of a policy that has
a cash surrender value from his estate to a third person but reserves to himself
the right to make further change of beneficiary, the trustee should get the cash
surrender value as of the time of the filing of the petition by virtue of
§ 70(a)(3).'9 However, if the insured also surrenders his right to change the
beneficiary, the third person gets a vested interest which is not defeasible by
the insured. 2 Here § 70(a)(3) would be of no aid to the trustee because no
power exists which the bankrupt could have exercised before the petition was
filed. This should not leave the trustee without a remedy; on the theory of a
fraudulent conveyance he should be able to recover the cash surrender value.21
The revision of the policy is, in effect, a gift of the cash surrender value by the
insolvent, 22 for, by surrendering his right to change the beneficiary, the insured
0

z6A gift by a solvent debtor is not a fraudulent conveyance. Glenn, Fraudulent Conveyances § 270 (1931).
X71n re Fetterman, supra note 15. It is a common practice to build up large insurance
policies as a form of investment as well as for the purpose of protecting dependents. By the
above method, the cash surrender value of such policies, in the event of bankruptcy, is available to the insured so long as no premiums were paid while he was insolvent. The insured
must, of course, depend upon the cooperation of the beneficiary in "cashing" the policy and in
giving him the proceeds; but this hazard is generally less than the ordinary hazards of business.
The objection to this device is that the cash surrender value is usually less than the policy's
reserve value (which is equal to the amount of premiums paid in less that sum set aside each
year by the insurer to enable him to pay the face value of the policy on the death of the insured)
because the insurance companies wish to discourage the surrendering of policies. Vance, Insurance 55 (2d ed. 1930). This being true, the insured is paying more than the actual cost of insuring his life, so that while he is solvent he has less incentive to invest in insurance, which will be
exempt in the event of bankruptcy, than in other things, which while not exempt will yield a
higher return.
isCrosby v. Sproul, 17 F. (2d) 325 (D.C. Mass. 1927).
'9 Since the insured still controls the policy by his having reserved the right to change the
beneficiary, the case is within the doctrine of Cohen v. Samuels, supra note ii.
20 Supra note 14.

21On this point, there is a paucity of bankruptcy cases. Cf. 16 Va. L. Rev. 271, 276 (193o)
which agrees that theoretically the change in the policy constitutes a fraudulent conveyance
but contends that the law is the other way, citing It re Fetterman, 243 Fed. 975 (D.C. Ohio
1917); In re Steele, 98 Fed. 78 (D.C. Ia. 1899); see McEwen v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 43 Calif.
App. 133, 183 Pac. 373, 376 (1919). However, these authorities are not in point.
"A gift by an insolvent debtor is a fraudulent conveyance. 'Glenn, Fraudulent Convey-

ances § 270 (r931).
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gave the third person an indefeasible interest in the policy at a time when it had
a definite value to creditors. The same result should follow where the policy
originally made a third person the beneficiary and the insured, while insolvent,
surrenders his right to change the beneficiary and attempts thereby to give the
third person a vested interest. Here again the giving up of the power to change
the beneficiary constitutes a fraudulent transfer for it deprives the trustee of the
opportunity both to exercise that power for the benefit of the creditors, and to
make available to them the cash value. The same problem is raised where the
insured, while insolvent, does not change the beneficiary but assigns the policy
without consideration. Here the assignment has been considered to be a fraudu23

lent conveyance.

Where the policy has no cash surrender value at the time the petition in
bankruptcy is filed, the subsequent death of the insured entitles the beneficiary
to the entire proceeds clear of any claims of the trustee, even though the insured
has always reserved the right to change the beneficiary. 24 The same result
should be reached where the insured's estate was the beneficiary, but while insolvent and when there was no cash surrender value, the insured made a third
party an absolute beneficiary. The vesting of the indefeasible interest in the
beneficiary is not a fraudulent conveyance because under generally accepted
rules, creditors do not have any means of reaching such a policy, and because
there is no value in the policy which would have gone to the trustee under the
proviso to § 70(a)(5) if there had been no change in the beneficiary. Navassa
Guano Co. v. Ellen Nixon Cockfield2s raises the interesting question whether the
fact that the appointment of an absolute beneficiary is made in anticipation of
death changes a transfer otherwise valid into a fraudulent conveyance. These
are the facts of the case: a creditor's bill was brought in the federal court
to recover the full proceeds of a policy after the death of the insured who, while
insolvent and in anticipation of imminent death, changed the beneficial interest
from his estate to his brother. At the time of the change and before the death of
the insured there was no cash surrender value. The new beneficiary contended
that if the insured had died a bankrupt, the trustee would have failed to get the
proceeds because the policy had no cash surrender value before the insured's
death and that, by analogy, the same result should follow in a proceeding on a
" Kirkpatrick v. Johnson, 197 Fed. 235 (D.C. Pa. 1912).
24 Everett v. Judson, 228 U.S. 474 (19r3); Burlingham v. Crouse, 228 U.S. 459 (1913).
Contra, but decided before the United States Supreme Court decisions, li re Welling, 113 Fed.
189 (C.C.A. 7th 1902);In re Slingluff, io6 Fed. 154 (D.C. Md. 9oo). These cases were based
on the theory that § 7o(a)(5) permitted the bankrupt-insured to redeem only policies with cash
surrender values, and that policies having no cash values passed to the trustee without being
redeemable. See 35 Harv. L. Rev. 8o (1921) supporting this interpretation. Where the policy
has no cash surrender value at the time the petition is filed because the bankrupt, while insolvent, borrowed on it, the trustee may follow that sum into the hands of a donee and recover it

as the subject of a fraudulent conveyance. Butler v. Rand, ii F. Supp. 343 (D.C. N.Y. 1935)
2S253 Fed. 883 (C.C.A. 4 th 1918).
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creditor's bill. The court ruled that the creditors were entitled to the proceeds
on a fraudulent conveyance theory. Despite the fact that the state law was well
settled that had the insured entertained ordinary expectations of life, the same
act would not have constituted a fraudulent conveyance, the certainty of death
at the time of the change of beneficiary gave the policy a definite value so that
it could be the subject matter of a fraudulent conveyance. It is conceivable
that the court might have reached the same result if the proceedings had been in
bankruptcy. To do this the trustee would have to proceed under § 70(e) or
§ 70(a)(4)26 on a theory that under the state law there had been a fraudulent
conveyance. The defense would have to rely on the many decisions7 construing
the proviso to § 70(a) (5) as never giving the trustee more than the cash surrender value as of the time the petition was filed and would have to argue that this
policy prevails over the express language of § 7o(a)(4) and § 70(e). In this connection Morris v. Dodd2S is pertinent. There the insured, within one month of
bankruptcy, made his wife the beneficiary in place of his estate. Upon the subsequent death of the insured, the trustee sought to recover the proceeds under
§ 70(e). It was held that the trustee acquired no rights in a policy having no
cash value before death. The trustee did not raise the point that the change of
the beneficiary was made in contemplation of death. Consequently, while the
case is not directly opposed to the Navassa case, it is significant because the
court refused to inquire into the state law to determine the validity of the transfer. Instead, it argued vigorously that the policy of the proviso to § 70(a)(5)
was to restrict the bankrupt in the use of his insurance only to the extent of the
cash surrender value.
II

The right of a trustee to get the cash surrender value under § 70(a)(5) is
limited by state exemption statutes 9 which are generally construed so liberally
26 Supranote 2. See Hays v. Harris, 78 F. (2d) 66, 72 (C.C.A. 8th x935) for suggestion that,
on a proper showing, the Navassa case might apply in bankruptcy. Because a petition in bankruptcy cannot be filed after the death of the debtor (see In re Hicks, 107 Fed. gio (D.C. Vt.
igoi)) the above situation could only arise where the petition was filed before his death.
Should it make any difference whether the change in beneficiary was made before or after the
petition in bankruptcy was filed? The time of the change, it would appear, is immaterial; the
determining fact is whether the insured became conscious of imminent death arose before or
after the petition. If before, then any transfer is like a conveyance of a policy that has a cash
surrender value-except that in the supposititious case, the amount of the fraudulent transfer
would be the full amount of the proceeds.
27Ehrhart v. New York Life Ins. Co., supra note 9; Everett v. Judson, supranote 24. "As
we have construed the statute (§ 7o(a)(5)), its purpose was to vest the surrender value in the
trustee for the beneft of the creditors, and not otherwise to limit the bankrupt in dealing with
his policy." Burlingham v. Crouse, 228 U.S. at 473 (I9M3).
28 iio Ga. 6o6, 36 S.E. 83 (0goo).
29 Holden v. Stratten, 198 U.S. 202 (i9o5) is the leading case holding that under § 6 and the
introductory clause in § 70(a) (5), supra note 2, state statutes exempting policies on the life of
the insured should be given full effect in determining the trustee's rights.

NOTES
that in many cases § 70(a)(5) has been impotent to protect creditors.30 These
statutes usually protect members of the insured's family3' although some include
any third persons.3 2 Assuming that the premiums were paid by the bankrupt
while solventSS and that the beneficiary is within the designated class, all statutes provide that all or a part of the proceeds are exempt from the claims of
creditors upon the death of the insured bankrupt,34 although under § 70(a)(5)
the trustee would have been entitled to the cash surrender value as of the date
the petition in bankruptcy was filed. The fact that in the usual case the beneficiaries are dependent on the deceased would seem to be sufficient justification
for the liberal exemption. But there is a sharp split of authority as to whether
the cash value of the policy is exempt also during the life of the bankrupt. The
statutes themselves are usually open to either construction, and whether they
are to be construed as exempting the cash surrender value only after the death

of the bankrupt or also during his life depends upon whether the court favors
the creditors or the beneficiary. A splendid example of this conflict is found in
Tennessee, the federal court in that state having decided both ways in recent
years. In 19o9 it was said, "Whatever may have been the intention of these
statutes, they were clearly not designed as a shield to protect the husband
himself from his creditors and to enable him, under the guise of a contingent
protection for his family, to make investments for his own benefit free from the
claims of his creditors." 35 In 1925, in a cases6 involving precisely the same stat30See In re Horwitz, 3 F. Supp. 16, 18 (D.C. N.Y. 1933). It has been contended that the
state exemption statutes should be liberally construed in favor of the beneficiary "in order to
advance the humane purpose of preserving to the unfortunate or improvident debtor or his
family the means of obtaining a livelihood and prevent them from becoming a charge on the
public." Hickman v. Hanover, 33 F. (2d) 873 (C.C.A. 4 th'1929 ).
31Brown v. Home Life Ins. Co., 3 F. (2d) 66i (D.C. Okla. 1925); In re Stansell, 8 F. (2d)
363 (D.C. Tenn. 1925); In re Grant, 21 F. (2d) 88 (D.C. Wis. 1927); In re Bendall, 28 F. (2d)
999 (D.C. N.D. 1928); Hickman v. Hanover, 33 F. (2d) 873 (C.C.A. 4 th 1929) (Md. stat.);
Pearsall v. Bloodworth, 149 N.C. 628, 140 S.E. 303 (1927); see In re Hammells, S F. (2d) 879,
88o (D.C. Ariz. i925).
32Murphy v. Casey, 151 Minn. 48o, 184 N.W. 783 (i92i); Mason's Minn. Stat. 1927 § 3387;
Cahill's Consol. N.Y. Laws (1930) c. 30, § 55a, inzfra note 39.
33Where a third person is an absolute beneficiary and the insured has paid the premiums

while insolvent, the trustee under § 70(e) gets the same rights to the policy as do the creditors
under the state law. 3 Remington, Bankruptcy § 1264 (1923).
34 See cases cited in notes 35 and 36, infra,for total exemptions; Hickman v. Hanover, 33 F.
(2d) 873 (C.C.A. 4 th 1929) (Md. stat. exempting up to $5oo.oo); Dreyfus v. Barton, 98 Miss.
758, 54 So. 254 (1911) (proceeds exempt up to $3o00.o0).
3s
In re Moore, i73 Fed. 679 (D.C. Tenn. igog). In accord, holding that the cash surrender
value is not exempt from the trustee under the state statute during the life of the bankrupt,
although the proceeds are exempt if the bankrupt is dead. In re Grant, 21 F. (2d) 88 (D.C.
Wis. 1927) (the Wisconsin statute was subsequently construed contra by the state court in
Cannon v. Lincoln Ins. Co., 208 Wis. 452, 243 N.W. 320 (1932)); Morgan v. McCaffrey, 286
Fed. 922 (C.C.A. 5th 1923); In re Samuels, 254 Fed. 775 (C.C.A. 2d 1918) decided before
§ 55A N.Y. Ins. Law was enacted, infra note 39.
361,; re Stansell, 8 F. (2d) 363 (D.C. Tenn. 1925). In accord, holding the entire cash surrender value exempt, although the debtor is alive, under state statutes which could just as well
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ute and situation, the court reversed itself and held that the cash value was exempt during the bankrupt's life. It said, "To sustain the principle laid down in
our former decision would be, to a certain extent, to limit the benefits of life insurance to the solvent and to deprive the insured of his protection at the very
time he needs it most, namely, when involved in financial difficulties." The
effect of this later decision is to permit the bankrupt, after his discharge, to have
the cash value for his own use. 37 Query whether this does not violate the purpose of the Bankruptcy Act in that it not only gives a debtor a new start in life
discharged of his liabilities but also gives him valuable assets.3S The effect of the
later decision is to distinguish between money in the debtor's bank account at
the time the petition in bankruptcy is filed and the same amount if invested in
insurance which can readily be turned into cash by the bankrupt. § 70(a)(5)
reaches a desirable compromise between the interests of the creditors and the
beneficiaries by giving to the former the cash value of the insurance and protecting the latter by giving them the policy. If the state statutes are clear, then,
of course, they must be enforced; but where they are ambiguous, they should
not be construed so as to give the insured a windfall in the form of the cash surrender value.39
have been construed to apply only upon death of the insured. Cannon v. Lincoln Ins. Co., 208
Wis. 452, 243 N.W. 320 (1932); In re Young, 208 Fed. 373 (D.C. Ohio 1912); In re Fetterman,
243 Fed. 975 (D.C. Ohio 1917).

In some states where the courts had construed the exemption statute to apply only upon
the death of the insured, the legislatures revised the statute so as to exempt the cash surrender
value during the insured's life. In re Lang, 2o F. (2d) 236 (D.C. Pa. 1927).
37 After the petition is filed, the bankrupt may make himself the beneficiary, or the beneficiary may borrow on the policy and give the proceeds to the bankrupt. The insured is thus indirectly protected as an incident of the general desire of the courts to protect the beneficiary.
SeeIn re Young, 208 Fed. 373, 378 (D.C. Ohio I912). The fact that the bankrupt after the
petition is filed actually uses the cash surrender value rather than the beneficiary, does not
affect the decisions. Inre Vaughn, 2 F. Supp. 385 (D.C. Fla. 1932); Cf. § SA N.Y. Stat. iMfra,
note 39.
38 See Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 582 (1935). It must be
admitted, however, that the inevitable result of exemption statutes is to give the bankrupt
assets. But where the exemption statutes do not clearly protect the beneficiary during the life
of the insured, there should be no departure from the general objective of the Bankruptcy.Act.
39 But the weight of authority does not recognize any evil in giving effect to exemption
statutes during the bankrupt's life. Supra note 36. Recent legislation has encouraged this
result. § 55A of the N.Y. Ins. Law expressly applies to policies in which the insured has reserved the right to change the beneficiary; "If a policy of insurance .... is effected by any
person on his own life or on another life, in favor of a person other than himself, or except in
cases of transfer with intent to defraud creditors, if a policy of life insurance is assigned or in
any way made payable to any such person, the lawful beneficiary or assignee thereof, other
than the insured or the person so effecting such insurance .... shall be entitled to its proceeds
and avails against the creditors and representatives of the insured .... whether or not the
right to change the beneficiary is reserved or permitted .... " Cahill's Consol. N.Y. Laws
(1930) c. 30, § 55A. § 55A thus avoids the effect of In re Samuels, 254 Fed. 775 (C.C.A. 2d
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The New York legislature has sought to achieve a compromise on this point.
§ 55(a) of the New York Insurance Law attempts both to protect the beneficiary and to preclude the insured bankrupt from using the cash surrender value
for his personal advantage.40 This sum is held exempt from the trustee when a
third party is the beneficiary,41 but if the bankrupt is the beneficiary, or upon
42
proof that he has changed the policy so as to get the cash value for his own use,
that amount as of the date the petition was filed becomes administered as assets
of the estate of the bankrupt. As a practical matter, the law is easily evaded.
Since the beneficiary is permitted to cash in the policy before43 or after44 the petition in bankruptcy is filed, there is nothing to prevent his giving the proceeds
to the insured. But the insured must be careful not to get the cash value in his
own name from the insurer, for in that event the trustee may claim the proceeds.45 Therefore, the statute does make the cooperation of the beneficiary
necessary, but in most cases this will not be an insuperable difficulty.
1918) which construed an older New York statute as not applicable during the life of the insured because of the absence of an express provision concerning the right to change the beneficiary. In contrast to the tendency for a liberal construction, Ehrhart v. New York Life Ins.
Co., 45 F. (2d) 8o4 (D.C. Ill. i929) is interesting. An Illinois statute exempting insurance
where the wife procures it on the life of her husband for her own benefit, had been so inter-

preted in state decisions that where the husband himself procured the insurance on his life for
the benefit of his wife, but did not reserve the right to change the beneficiary, he was treated as
the agent of his wife and the policy was within the statutory exemption. In the Ehrhart case,
however, the federal court held that where the insured reserved the right to change the beneficiary, the policy which the husband secured for the benefit of his wife did not come within the
statute even though the bankrupt had died after the petition, in spite of the fact that there was
no danger of the insured's using the proceeds for himself. See also, li re Weisman, OF. Supp.
3r2 (D.C. N.Y. 1934).
40 Cahill's Consol. N.Y. Laws (1930) c. 30, § 55a; In re Messinger, 29 F. (2d) 158 (C.C.A.
2d 1928);It re Horwitz, 3 F. Supp. 16 (D.C. N.Y. 1933);Iflre Beach, 8 F. Supp. 9io (D.C.
Mass. 1934), placing a similar construction on a Massachusetts statute.

Schwartz v. Holzman, 69 F. (2d) 814 (C.C.A. 2d 1934).
See Schwartz v. Holzman, ibid.; Butler v. Rand, ii F. Supp. 344 (D.C. N.Y. 1935).
43 Schwartz v. Holzman, supra note 41.
44I
Messinger,
M
supra note 40.
4S Butler v. Rand, ii F. Supp. 343 (D.C. N.Y. 1935), in which the insured borrowed $5,ooo
on his policy and bought shares of stock for, and in the name of, his wife, who was the beneficiary under the policy. When the insured was adjudged bankrupt, his trustee in bankruptcy
sought to set aside the transfer. It was held that the stock was not exempt within § 55a of the
4'

43

N.Y. Ins. Law. Cf. Schwartz v. Holzman, supranote 41, where the insured prior to bankruptcy

borrowed on the policy, received a check payable jointly to himself and his wife, and deposited
the check in her bank account. The trustee was not allowed to recover the cash surrender
value.

